Stoning for Adultery: Still a Reality in Iran

Iran remains the darkest and most barbaric spot on the planet in terms of capital punishment. It is one of the very few countries where the rate of executions is actually increasing. Moreover, the death penalty is practiced for such ‘crimes’ as adultery and homosexual conduct among adults.

Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, who is a 43-year-old widow and mother of two children, has been facing execution by stoning for adultery. Some recent reports suggest that Iran has retreated from its plans, following international protests, but that it will still conduct the execution by hanging.
Meanwhile, a so-called Iranian human rights ‘expert’, Mohammed Javed Larijani, who is head of the ‘human rights council’ of the Iranian judiciary, has condemned international protests against the execution, saying that Iran's judicial system will not change its direction because of ‘Western attacks’ and ‘media pressures’. All I can say about this 'expert' is that he didn't graduate from our human rights programme.
In 1999, I visited Iran to lecture about international criminal law. I was asked by lawyers in the government whether Iran might be subject to prosecutions for crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court because it conducts executions of women for adultery by stoning. I was then told there were a handful of such executions every year, and the question was a technical one: would this be a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population? More recently, I was back in Iran and when I recalled this conversation. I was told: ‘We don’t do that anymore.’
At events in Iran, speakers always begin with homage to Allah who is described as ‘the most merciful’. But the State isn’t very merciful when it comes to capital punishment. Rather the opposite. Some explain that this thirst for barbaric punishments comes from Islamic laws and doctrines. But I think that Islam and its laws are indeed fundamentally 'merciful'. The problem is that barbaric regimes hide behind distorted and anachronistic versions of religious text as justification for what tyrants - whatever their religion - have been imposing on their people since time immemorial.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Invoked by Movie Star

Movie star Lindsay Lohan, who has been sentenced to a prison term, of 90 days, for minor offences relating to drug and alcohol abuse, the administration of justice and breaches of probation orders. She has invoked the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Apparently, she referred to article 5 of the Declaration on Twitter: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ Lindsay Lohan may not be getting much public sympathy, but she has a good point and deserves our support. The United States is said to have about 2 million people in jail. This is hugely disproportionate to the practice in virtually every other country. Much of that is explained by imprisonment for minor crimes, like the case of Lindsay Lohan. Do they really need to put even more people in jail? She obviously has some problems that need solving, but who can seriously believe that a few months in jail is the answer?
The character limits on Twitter probably prevented Lindsay from explaining the subtleties of article 5, and its application to disproportionate punishments. In fact, this is an area where human rights courts and tribunals have been very reluctant to tread. Theoretically, a sentence that was grossly disproportionate to the crime could be challenged under article 5 of the Universal Declaration, or its manifestations in treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 7) and the European Convention on Human Rights (art. 3). There is some case law at the European Court concerning disproportionate sentences imposed upon juvenile offenders, but I think that Lindsay is too old to qualify. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights restricts the death penalty to the ‘most serious crimes’, but again I don’t think this applies to Lindsay’s case.
I might be wrong, but the conviction is in California where they have a ‘three strikes’ law. So if she does this a couple of times more, could she be sent to prison for life without parole? That would clearly be a disproportionate sentence, and it would be condemned universally. There are significant numbers of old men and women in American prisons who have committed enough minor offences that they get put away forever.

Middlesex University Launches MA in Human Rights and Business

To celebrate the launch of the MA Human Rights and Business, Middlesex University (London, Hendon Campus) will host an interactive panel discussion on “Human Rights and Business: Towards Ethical Globalisation?” on 14 July from 6 to 9 PM. The panel will include Chris Avery (Director of the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre), Martyn Day (Senior Partner at Leigh Day &Co), Petter Matthews (Construction Industry Transparency Initiative), Stephanie Stocker (Clifford Chance) and Prof. Joshua Castellino, Head of the Law Department at Middlesex. Spaces are limited, so please confirm attendance with Sharon Procter at humanrights@mdx.ac.uk.
The MA is taught once a month in London, on Fridays and Saturdays, to accommodate professionals. For more information on the programme, click here.

Civilian Killings by US Troops Investigated by Korean Truth Commission

Recent rulings by the South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission have held that on more than 100 occasions during the Korean war in the ealry 1950s civilians were killed by US troops. However, the Commission decided not to proceed with criminal charges, either because of a lack of sufficient evidence or because the killings were militarily justified, according to a report in today's New York Times.

Lubanga Trial is Stayed Again

Two years ago, the first trial at the International Criminal Court went pear-shaped as the Trial Chamber ordered a stay of proceedings because of the inability of the Prosecutor to provide full disclosure. The trial began in 2009, but has hit another major snag abou the issue of so-called 'intermediaries'. These are individuals - NGOs, aid workers, etc. - who act as go-betweens between witnesses and the Office of the Prosecutor. Recently the Trial Chamber made orders concerning the disclosure of the identity of some of these intermediaries, but its rulings have not been followed by the Prosecutor.
Today, clearly frustrated by the defiance of the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber decided to play hardball. It ordered another stay of proceedings in Lubanga, recalling that its authority to make such a stay had been confirmed by the Appeals Chamber and that a temporary stay of proceedings was just that, and would presumably become permanent at a certain point in time.
Here are some of the relevant passages from today's ruling:

21. The second problem, however, reveals a more profound and enduring concern. The Prosecutor, by his refusal to implement the orders of the Chamber and in the filings set out above, has revealed that he does not consider that he is bound to comply with judicial decisions that relate to a fundamental aspect of trial proceedings, namely the protection of those who have been affected by their interaction with the Court, in the sense that they have had dealings with the prosecution. Essentially, for the issues covered by Article 68 in this way, he appears to argue that the prosecution has autonomy to comply with, or disregard, the orders of the Chamber, depending on its interpretation of its responsibilities under the Rome Statute framework.
24. Article 68 of the Statute gives the Prosecutor positive protective obligations when investigating and prosecuting crimes - "the Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes" - but those responsibilities do not give him licence, or discretion, or autonomy to disregard judicial orders because he considers the Chamber's Decision is inconsistent with his interpretation of his obligations...
27. No criminal court can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an order in a particular area, it is for the Prosecutor to elect whether or not to implement it, depending on his interpretation of his obligations. The judges, not the Prosecutor, decide on protective measures during the trial...
28. The Prosecutor has chosen to prosecute this accused. In the Chamber's judgment, he cannot be allowed to continue with this prosecution if he seeks to reserve to himself the right to avoid the Court's orders whenever he decides that they are inconsistent with his interpretation of his other obligations. In order for the Chamber to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, it is necessary that its orders, decisions and rulings are respected, unless and until they are overturned on appeal, or suspended by order of the Court.

Thanks to Maria Varaki.

Finnish Genocide Judgment

Last month, there were newspaper reports of the judgment by Finnish courts convicting a Rwandan for having participated in the 1994 genocide. I have managed to obtain a copy of the summary of the decision.
Thanks to Mikaela Heikkilä.

Gaza and the International Criminal Court

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court continues to consider whether or not to initiate an investigation into the situation in Gaza. Last year, he was given jurisdiction over Gaza in a declaration filed by the Palestinian Authority in accordance with article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. The preliminary issue is whether the declaration is legally valid. Dr Michael Kearney, who has been working with the Palestinian NGO Al Haq, has written a very good article on this, published by the UCLA Human Rights & International Criminal Law Online Forum.

Three Years of Blogging

Today marks three years since I began this blog. There have been 700 entries to the blog over that time, and many comments from its readers. I am especially grateful to the many contributors, who send me information or documents that they have come across. I hope such participation in the life of the blog will continue.
It was originally started as a mechanism for me to keep in touch with my own doctoral students while I was on sabbatical leave. When the time came to tick the box indicating whether or not the blog could be accessed by the general public, I decided there was no reason not to open it up. If memory serves me, I was in Oxford as a visiting lecturer when I made the first posting, and when I figured out how to actually operate a blog (it isn't exactly rocket science). Since then, I have made postings from all corners of the globe, even in China, until 2008 when the authorities decided to prevent access.
Despite the name, it isn't just for doctoral students. But it does encourage some people to take the plunge and embark on what I call 'the Mount Everest of higher education', and I hope that will continue.
The blog now has many thousands of readers, according to Google Analytics. They are located around the world.
Thanks for reading, for contributing, and for telling others about it.
WS

Aggression is Now a Crime: David Scheffer in International Herald Tribune

David Scheffer, left, with Bianca Jagger and Andrew Clapham at the Kampala Review Conference

David Scheffer, the former (and first) United States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues has written a wonderful op-ed in today's International Herald Tribune on the outcome of the International Criminal Court’s Review Conference.
David’s voice is very important not just as a former American diplomat but also as a an academic. He is professor of human rights at Northwestern University in Chicago. I join David, and other academics like Andrew Clapham of Geneva and Roger Clark of Rutgers, in welcoming the amendment of the Rome Statute to incorporate the crime of aggression.
Professor Scheffer was a regular contributor to my blog on the Kampala Conference and his perceptive articles on the negotiations provide a fine insight into the process of adoption of the amendment.

UK Supreme Court Rules Against Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law

The new United Kingdom Supreme Court, in R (on the application of Smith) v. The Secretary of State for Defence et al. [2010] UKSC 29, has ruled against the extraterritorial application of human rigthts law, dismissing an applicationby a soldier who had died on duty in Iraq. The judgment itself is a nightmare to understand, with each individual member of the Court writing a separate opinion and no common decision or agreed summary. Fortunately, the Court services have prepared a summary that assists in understanding the ruling. The decision(s) is (are) full of references to the international human rights authorities, including the notorious Bankovic decision of the European Court of Human Rights.
Thanks to Eadaoin O'Brien.