A weblog for students engaged in doctoral studies in the field of human rights. It is intended to provide information about contemporary developments, references to new publications and material of a practical nature.
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Friday, 16 February 2018
Judicial Independence in Times of Crisis
There are still a small number of guest places available for our British Academy conference in March on 'Challenges to Judicial Independence in Times of Crisis'. Full details and a registration link are here. Book now to avoid disappointment!
Speakers include:
Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the Supreme Court
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, former Lord Justice of England and Wales
M Guy Canivet, former President, Cour de Cassation
Sir Konrad Schiemann, former Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union
His Honour Jeremy Roberts QC, The Parole Board for England and Wales
Dame Sue Carr, High Court, Midland Circuit
Professor Fiona De Londras, University of Birmingham
Professor David Sklansky, Stanford University
Professor John Jackson, University of Nottingham
Professor Kate Malleson, Queen Mary University of London
Professor Ilias G. Anagnostopoulos, Athens Law School
Professor Martina Feilzer, Bangor University
Professor Raphaële Parizot, Université Paris-Nanterre
Professor Julian Petley, Brunel University London
Professor Vian Bakir, Bangor University
Dr Daniel Aguirre, University of Greenwich
Dr Moa Bladini, University of Gothenburg
Dr Lawrence McNamara, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law and University of York
Dr Stephen Skinner, University of Exeter
Dr Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Brunel University
Lt. Col. Harry Mynors, Army Legal Service
Dr Yvonne McDermott Rees, Swansea University
Guest post: Michael Kearney, 'Al-Werfalli and the Presumption of Innocence'
We are delighted to welcome Dr. Michael Kearney, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Sussex, for this guest post.
In welcoming students to a black letter international
crimes module, one of the initial, contextual, points worth emphasising is that
since the individuals brought before international courts do tend to have been
obviously responsible for serious crimes, we have to double down on our
commitment to the presumption of innocence. It’s useful to acknowledge, if only
by reference to logistics, the selectivity of international courts, and the
unease that only a few individuals from among a potentially huge cast in any
scenario are being prosecuted. It’s also helpful to flag up, how, since an
accused may have been quite remote or detached from the physical perpetration
of crimes, the appropriate interpretation and application of the various modes
of liability will be crucial to the outcome of a case.
Last week I asked LLM/MA students to read
the ICC’s August 2017 Arrest
Warrant, and subsequent statements made by
the OTP, in the case against Mahmoud Al-Werfalli in the situation in Libya. It
seemed a useful first case to review in a new module since it was both topical
and atypically straightforward: the accused was charged as a physical
perpetrator of murder as a war crime, so no need for convoluted engagement with
indirect coperpetration or the contextual elements of crimes against humanity. Considering
the executions in question had been recorded and videos of them posted online,
and the accused having been detained then released by his superiors, this could
be regarded as having been as straightforward a prosecution as the OTP would
get.
So straightforward in fact that the Arrest
Warrant, in addressing whether the evidence showed reasonable grounds to the
believe Al-Werfalli had committed a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction had
the following to say at para 28:
“Further, the
Chamber finds that Mr Al-Werfalli personally committed the murders described in
Incidents 1, 2, 3 and one of the murders described in Incident 7, and that he
ordered, as a superior to others in the Al-Saiqa Brigade, the commission of the
murders described in Incidents 4, 5, 6, and 19 of the murders described in
Incident 7. The Chamber is further satisfied that he acted with intent and
knowledge, and that he was aware of the status of the victims and of the
factual circumstances that established the existence of the non-international
armed conflict.”
To be clear, the paragraph continues in the
next sentence to note that the Chamber ‘therefore finds reasonable grounds to
believe that Mr Al-Werfalli bears individual criminal responsibility as a
direct perpetrator’, while the summing up declaration notes ‘alleged criminal
responsibility’. The OTP’s statement
following issuance of the warrant clearly asserts: ‘Mr al-Werfalli is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and the burden is on my Office to prove that he is
guilty of the crimes we allege he committed. My Office can only discharge that
burden if Mr al-Werfalli appears before ICC judges.’
Previously, in providing students with
examples of the type of legal reasoning which would result in their struggling
to pass a module, I reached for former Prosecutor Ocampo’s July 2010 Guardian
piece on the Arrest Warrant for Al Bashir. While the entire proceedings
revolved around the meaning of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’, Ocampo falsely asserted
that a man who had never been brought before a judge, had been found by the ICC
to be ‘deliberately inflicting on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups
living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction.’
Much has been made of the purpose of
proceedings before the ICC’s Pre Trial Chambers, tending towards the consensus
that while crucial, this particular stage should not be understood as a
mini-trial. Introducing a case such as that against Al Werfalli, where the
evidence against him is so glaringly odius and obvious, should be the perfect
opportunity to illustrate, as per the OTP’s statement above, that the man
remains innocent until proven otherwise. It’s difficult, when introducing
students to the study of international criminal law, to have to somehow try and
explain how it is that ICC judges, in drafting this Warrant, could, to such a
degree, appear to violate that fundamental principle of criminal law which is
common knowledge to all laypersons.